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THE DARK AGES OF THE GOLDEN DAWN: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 
TWILIGHT ZONE OF THE GREEK CRISIS. 
Dr. Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, University of Durham 
 
The effects of the economic crisis on Greece are many and multifarious, while 
their analysis and proper evaluation is by no means an easy task for 
anthropologists. This comment is being written in the shadow of two deaths of 
Greek university students in the provincial town or Larissa due to carbon 
monoxide poisoning. The students, who could not afford to pay for central 
heating, had regularly been using an impromptu charcoal burning brazier that 
eventually turned to be lethal1. Less than two weeks before this incident, Britain’s 
Guardian newspaper, drawing on EU data, warned its readers that Greece is a 
country in serious poverty with a considerable proportion of its population facing 
moderate to extreme material deprivation2. Greece has been hit by an 
unprecedented humanitarian crisis, the effects of which are still difficult to 
measure and appreciate.  
At the same time, a different but equally severe kind of humanitarian crisis is 
unfolding in all major Greek cities. It concerns a large category of people 
colloquially termed ‘illegal immigrants’ (lathrometanástes), but in reality affects every 
person who is not –or does not seem to be-Greek. Refugees from countries like 
Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, asylum seekers, sometimes students 
and even tourists become victims of racist violence daily on the streets of Athens, 
Thessaloniki, Chania and Patras. Most of these assaults have been attributed to 
‘Golden Dawn’(Chrisí Avgí), a neo-nazi political party whose share of votes soared 
from 0.29% in the 2009 elections to 6.9% in the elections of 2012 and translated 
                                                          
1 See newspaper Ethnos 02/03/2013. For English version see 
http://dawnofthegreeks.wordpress.com/2013/03/02/ 
2 See Guardian 11 February 2013. For online version see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-eu 
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into eighteen seats in the Greek parliament. The party’s provocatively fascist 
public statements and the criminal assaults that have been attributed to their 
members—including the fact that their spokesperson while in a TV show 
physically attacked on air a woman MP of the communist party—have not 
prevented Golden Dawn from increasing its popularity.  The latest opinion polls 
(February 2013) estimate its support to be between ten and twelve percent and 
they surmise that should elections be held now, Golden Dawn would become the 
third political power in Greek parliament.  
As with every other aspect of the current political and economic climate in 
Greece, the rise of the Golden Dawn is a hugely complex, multidimensional 
phenomenon characterized by great complexity. While we may know who 
constitute the eponymous corpus of Chrisí Avgí and the inner, military-like 
organized circle that compose the party’s main structure –and we may equally 
dispute their wicked ideological and political character- we, as anthropologists do 
not know why thousands of anonymous Greeks seem to be offering support to 
this neo-nazi group. Many journalists and public commentators prefer to literally 
explain away the phenomenon through the claim that radical nationalism is not a 
new occurrence. According to this view, supporters of the far right have always 
existed. They where thus far hidden in mainstream political parties and they have 
now merely become an apparent force as a result of the disintegration of changes 
in the local political scene. Such an explanation would be tempting, if it was not 
for the fact that it confines thousands of Greeks into the uncomfortable and 
generalizing category of the ‘fascist’.  
Another popular explanation a contrast to this, is to argue that the Golden Dawn 
became strong solely in the context of and as a result of the economic crisis. In 
my opinion it would be a tremendous oversimplification to claim that Chrisí Avgí 
can be explained simply in terms of and as a result of the pressure that the 
economic crisis has exerted on the Greek public. The people who are coming 
closer to the Golden Dawn day by day are not making this political choice solely 
because they view the party as an anti-systemic political alternative that will put 
the final nail in the coffin of the old regime. Rather, it seems that support for the 
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neo-nazi radicalist discourses is not just an innocent message against the post-war 
political system of corruption and feckless governance. I suggest that partly it is its 
product.  
The economic crisis and the humanitarian crisis that have hit the Greek people 
operate as a context and as a field (in the sense that Bourdieu theorized it) for the 
rise of extremism in Greece. Extremism is certainly fuelled by an embedded 
nationalism that has been systematically cultivated through education and in the 
public sphere since Second World War as has been so well documented in the 
anthropology of Greece3. Xenophobic and extreme right wing discourses find 
great support in the familiar idea of the ‘enemy within’, which has been an 
instrumental concept in Cold War politics in a country whose “geopolitical 
importance in Cold War years constituted foreign intervention not an exception 
but a consistent pattern in Greece’s relationship with the West”  (Kirtsoglou 2006: 
80; cf. Clogg 1992: 146-7). This notion of the enemy within – what we might call a 
hollow category in itself (cf. Theodossopoulos 2007)- refers to the ‘foreigners’ 
(allodapoi) as sweepingly today as it did in the past when it was used to discriminate 
against communists, proving that political rhetoric produces multivalent tropes 
that are easily manipulated in their very perseverance.    
One of the main political arguments that the Golden Dawn routinely puts forward 
–with success- relates to fundamental cultural differences between ‘foreigners’ and 
Greeks. Based on the claim that most of the immigrants come from Muslim 
countries, Chrisí Avgí cunningly plays with a number of social representations that 
were born and methodically nurtured in the context of the ‘war against terror’ in 
the aftermath of September 11. Images of backward ‘Taliban’ who beat women in 
the street—shown in international networks and reproduced by local media—
have encouraged a view of the world divided in terms of a‘clash of civilizations’ 
paradigm, which is a simplistic perspective even if it is not alien even to the 
academic world, as the work of authors like Huntington (1996) demonstrate (cf. 
Brown and Theodossopoulos 2003). The very reasoning that the United States 
                                                          
3 See indicatively but not exhaustively: Theodossopoulos (ed) 2007; Karakasidou 1997; Brown & Hamilakis 
(eds) 2003; Cowan 2000. 
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deployed in order to gain support for intervening in countries like Iraq and 
Afghanistan – arguing that it was restoring democracy and human rights in those 
countries - is coming to haunt democracy and human rights in today’s turbulent 
Greek politics.  
Another important dimension of an anthropological explanation of the rise of the 
Golden Dawn relates to the character of the nation-state as the ‘fullest 
institutional expression of human solidarity we have to date’ (Wilkins 1992: 
26).Currently the nation state operates as the ultimum refugium for an uneasy and 
confused ethnos, which –despite its pricey commitment to the West- has always 
been like an interior exclusion in the West itself (cf. Kirtsoglou 2006), its 
‘asymmetric partner’ (cf. Stefanidis 2002). What is going on is perceived in Greece 
as a distinctive lack of European support and a punitive attitude from their 
European partners, and it is steadily transforming the content of yet another 
hollow category, that of Anti-Americanism. This concept operated for years as a 
cultural metaphor for felt and lived power asymmetries in the international 
political field. Now anti-Americanism is giving way to anti-Europeanism, and 
haphazardly but steadily sustaining collective feelings of closure and xenophobia 
(cf. Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010). This is especially true vis-à-vis the 
rules of the Shengen treaty on immigration that are forcing Greece to become a 
huge detainee camp4 whilst the country struggles to effectively guard its vast 
coastal areas. The lack of European and international support to the Greek people 
and the extreme neo-liberal focus on debt-reducing economic policies that treat 
the state and its inhabitants as one and the same entity, are encouraging Greeks to 
further identify with the nation state and provide support to nationalist ideologies. 
Cosmopolitan attitudes and discourses appear to a great number of Greek people 
not only as irrelevant, but as a luxury that only elites can afford. As my Greek 
informants and fellow citizens often bitterly point out, a suburban lifestyle –even 
today- guarantees that the ‘foreigners’ (allodapoí) that the upper class fraternizes 
with tend to be their domestic servants and not the destitute Pakistani refugees, or 
                                                          
4 See indicatively newspaper wall street journal September 15 2012. For online version see 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444506004577617383132000476.html 
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Somali prostitutes that cross paths with the disenfranchised inhabitants of the 
centre of Athens.   
The actual role of the local elites is of course hugely important, particularly in its 
historical dimension and depth. The anthropology of Greece has amply 
documented the processes through which, for several decades after the Second 
World War, local elites specifically cultivated nationalist sentiment through 
education policy and public culture. As I noted, extreme right wing discourses 
were systematically promoted in post WWII Greece and supported by the Cold 
War climate. Elsewhere (2006) I have considered the role and power of the para-
state apparatus (parakrátos). This is also something that cannot be understood 
outside the context of international Cold War politics, flourishing and culminating 
as it did under the US-supported military junta that fell in 1974. Post-1974 Greece 
however, saw the rise of another kind of elite that reached its peak of power and 
influence in the 1990s. James Faubion has captured the character of this ‘socially 
conscious member of a literary new wave’ in his 1993 Modern Greek lessons, in the 
person of Loukas Theodorakopoulos, a supporter of homosexual rights in 
Greece:  
Both his education and his experiences were solidly international… 
he [conformed to] the pattern of the Greek ‘modernizer’ […]. They 
were “students who had studied abroad”…  and who brought what 
strategies and technologies they had acquired back home with them 
after the junta’s demise (Faubion 1993: 234). 
Academically educated –mainly away from Greece- and exposed to a self-
conscious cosmopolitanism and tolerance, the representatives of this new elite 
with its mostly upper middle-class background, yet whichnevertheless cannot be 
reduced to its class position, fervently supported the project of deconstructing 
Greek nationalism, theoretically, analytically and in practice. This was a globally 
conscious literary new wave – to which I see myself as belongong –and it 
undertook the enormous task of looking nationalism in the eye and uncovering its 
heinous role in the formation of local political selves. Sadly, our communal 
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effortsweretoo frequently removed from lived history, from the embedded 
memories of older people like those who crashed on Greekshores in refugee boats 
after the Asia Minor Catastrophe5, or of those who fought the Axis powers in 
1940. Our –dare I say, elitist- approach was very much disconnected from the 
feelings of the general population, people who had acquired considerable 
consumer power, who looked and behaved like their counterparts elsewhere in 
Europe, but who had received a nationalist and formalist education (cf. Mouzelis 
1978: 145), which was of dubious usefulness since outward appearances 
notwithstanding, their professional future depended largely solely on the clientelist 
networks of political parties. In a country where ‘connections’ are the only means 
to ‘get things done’ (cf. Sutton 2003: 200), where the social contract proves to be a 
fragile myth (Kirtsoglou 2006) and belonging to an international community as an 
equal partner turns out to be a mere folly (cf. Clogg 1992; Argyrou 2002) citizens 
are left with what cultural metaphors they can trust; namely kinship, the state-as-
kinship and the nation-as-kinship (cf. Just 1989).  
The rise of the Golden Dawn demonstrates –but does not exhaust- the 
amplification of at times extreme nationalist sentiments in Greece, but it also 
indicates the multi-level failure of this reformist movement to institute real change 
in Greek political culture. We, as anthropologists6, might have succeeded in 
recording the voices of minorities, and in exposing oppressive and exclusionist 
strategies that required our immediate anthropological attention but we have not 
succeeded in making a real difference in the ideological fabric of Greek society. 
This failure can be mostly attributed to the fact that we were not always careful in 
the way we tried to see the world from the informants’ point of view, taking local 
discourses seriously. In our hastiness to deconstruct the larger workings of power, 
we acted like Galtung’s scientific colonialists; we assumed that ‘we knew more 
about Greeks than Greeks knew about themselves’ (Galtung 1967: 13; cf. also 
                                                          
5 I am referring here to the defeat of the Greek Army in the shores of Asia Minor in 1922 . For more details see 
Hirschon 1989.  
6 This comment does not exclude other academics (historians, archaeologists and so forth). It focuses however on 
anthropologists because of the specificity of our methods which will become evident in the next sentences.  
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Argyrou 2002), and we often located “the centre of gravity for the acquisition of 
knowledge about the nation… outside the nation itself” (1967: 13). 
The growing influence of Chrisí Avgí among the middle and lower income groups 
of Greek society on the one hand, and the refueling of radical nationalism 
generally on the other, are political phenomena that we can no longer afford to 
analyze from the comfort zone of our desks. For real people are being losing real 
lives on the streets of Greek cities; and these people are sometimes Greek and 
more often non-Greek, but in all cases disempowered, materially deprived, scared 
and disenfranchised. They are historically situated selves and we need to 
appreciate their histories instead of seeing them as ‘anomalies’ in hegemonic 
discourses of “progress” (Asad 1991). If we cannot take our informants seriously, 
if we cannot relate to their painful histories and if we cannot produce grassroots 
analysis of their fears and apprehensions, then we can never represent them 
anthropologically and we will never allow their voices to be heard. That task will 
continue to be undertaken by a group of dark-minded thugs who –ironically- call 
themselves ‘The Golden Dawn’.   
 
*** 
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